Cognition and Emotion: Aristotelian Affinities with Contemporary Emotion Research Export

@article{citeulike:6031127, abstract = {In much of the debate concerning the philosophy and psychology of cognition and emotion, Aristotle's theory is taken to support a functionalist, cognition-first account. This brand of functionalism emphasizes functional role over occupant, or supervenient over physiochemical, the so-called software vs hardware' distinction. We argue, instead, that this functionalist reading misrepresents Aristotle because it downgrades the significance of his ideas about the biological bases of emotions and, in particular, affect-first processes in emotions. In addition to presenting a detailed critique of this functionalist interpretation of Aristotelian psychology, we offer an alternative reading of Aristotle's theory of cognition and emotion that brings to bear certain biological considerations evidenced in his arguments on the integration of form and matter (hylomorphism) and the hierarchical organization of the biological world. Based on this new reading, we identify affinities with contemporary research in the cognitive neuroscience of emotion and developmental research on emotion. 10.1177/0959354305057267}, author = {Kafetsios, Konstantinos and LaRock, Eric}, citeulike-article-id = {6031127}, citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0959354305057267}, citeulike-linkout-1 = {http://tap.sagepub.com/content/15/5/639.abstract}, citeulike-linkout-2 = {http://tap.sagepub.com/content/15/5/639.full.pdf}, day = {1}, doi = {10.1177/0959354305057267}, journal = {Theory Psychology}, keywords = {aristotle, cognition\_and\_emotion, cognitive\_neuroscience\_of\_emotion, emotions}, month = {October}, number = {5}, pages = {639--657}, posted-at = {2009-10-29 04:15:54}, priority = {2}, title = {Cognition and Emotion: Aristotelian Affinities with Contemporary Emotion Research}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0959354305057267}, volume = {15}, year = {2005} }

TY - JOUR ID - citeulike:6031127 L3 - citeulike-article-id:6031127 N2 - In much of the debate concerning the philosophy and psychology of cognition and emotion, Aristotle's theory is taken to support a functionalist, cognition-first account. This brand of functionalism emphasizes functional role over occupant, or supervenient over physiochemical, the so-called software vs hardware' distinction. We argue, instead, that this functionalist reading misrepresents Aristotle because it downgrades the significance of his ideas about the biological bases of emotions and, in particular, affect-first processes in emotions. In addition to presenting a detailed critique of this functionalist interpretation of Aristotelian psychology, we offer an alternative reading of Aristotle's theory of cognition and emotion that brings to bear certain biological considerations evidenced in his arguments on the integration of form and matter (hylomorphism) and the hierarchical organization of the biological world. Based on this new reading, we identify affinities with contemporary research in the cognitive neuroscience of emotion and developmental research on emotion. 10.1177/0959354305057267 IS - 5 JF - Theory Psychology EP - 657 TI - Cognition and Emotion: Aristotelian Affinities with Contemporary Emotion Research VL - 15 SP - 639 KW - aristotle KW - cognition_and_emotion KW - cognitive_neuroscience_of_emotion KW - emotions AU - Kafetsios, Konstantinos AU - LaRock, Eric PY - 2005/10/01/ UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0959354305057267 ER -