Does Lootable Wealth Breed Disorder?: A Political Economy of Extraction Framework Export

@article{citeulike:1586540, abstract = {This article proposes a political economy of extraction framework that explains political order and state collapse as alternative outcomes in the face of lootable wealth. Different types of institutions of extraction can be built on lootable resources--with divergent effects on political stability. If rulers are able to forge institutions of extraction that give them control of revenues generated by lootable resources, then these resources can contribute to political order by providing the income with which to govern. Conversely, the breakdown or absence of such institutions increases the risk of civil war by making it easier for rebels to organize. The framework is used to explain two puzzling cases that experienced sharply contrasting political trajectories in the face of lootable resources: Sierra Leone and Burma. A focus on institutions of extraction provides a stronger understanding of the wide range of political outcomes--from chaos, to dictatorship, to democracy--in resource-rich countries. 10.1177/0010414006288724}, author = {Snyder, Richard}, citeulike-article-id = {1586540}, citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0010414006288724}, citeulike-linkout-1 = {http://cps.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/39/8/943}, day = {1}, doi = {10.1177/0010414006288724}, journal = {Comparative Political Studies}, keywords = {civil-conflict, resources}, month = {October}, number = {8}, pages = {943--968}, posted-at = {2007-08-23 19:25:43}, priority = {5}, title = {Does Lootable Wealth Breed Disorder?: A Political Economy of Extraction Framework}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0010414006288724}, volume = {39}, year = {2006} }

TY - JOUR ID - citeulike:1586540 L3 - citeulike-article-id:1586540 N2 - This article proposes a political economy of extraction framework that explains political order and state collapse as alternative outcomes in the face of lootable wealth. Different types of institutions of extraction can be built on lootable resources--with divergent effects on political stability. If rulers are able to forge institutions of extraction that give them control of revenues generated by lootable resources, then these resources can contribute to political order by providing the income with which to govern. Conversely, the breakdown or absence of such institutions increases the risk of civil war by making it easier for rebels to organize. The framework is used to explain two puzzling cases that experienced sharply contrasting political trajectories in the face of lootable resources: Sierra Leone and Burma. A focus on institutions of extraction provides a stronger understanding of the wide range of political outcomes--from chaos, to dictatorship, to democracy--in resource-rich countries. 10.1177/0010414006288724 IS - 8 JF - Comparative Political Studies EP - 968 TI - Does Lootable Wealth Breed Disorder?: A Political Economy of Extraction Framework VL - 39 SP - 943 KW - civil-conflict KW - resources AU - Snyder, Richard PY - 2006/10/01/ UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0010414006288724 ER -