Information leakage in innovation outsourcing Export

@article{citeulike:5943802, abstract = {This paper studies an R\&D outsourcing contract between a firm and a contractor, considering the possibility that in the interim stage, the contractor might sell the innovation to a rival firm. Our result points out that due to the competition in the interim stage, the reward needed to prevent leakage will be pushed up to the extent that a profitable leakage-free contract does not exist. This result will also apply to cases considering revenue-sharing schemes and a disclosure punishment for commercial theft. Then, we demonstrate that in a competitive mechanism where the R\&D firm hires two contractors together with a relative performance scheme, the disclosure punishment might help and there exists a perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium where the probability of information leakage is lower and the equilibrium reward is also cheaper than hiring one contractor.}, address = {Department of Economics, National Chengchi University, Taiwan. sjho@nccu.edu.tw}, author = {Ho, Shirley J.}, citeulike-article-id = {5943802}, citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9310.2009.00574.x}, citeulike-linkout-1 = {http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/abstract/122651164/ABSTRACT}, doi = {10.1111/j.1467-9310.2009.00574.x}, issn = {1467-9310}, journal = {R\&D Management}, keywords = {information\_management, innovation, security}, number = {5}, pages = {431--443}, posted-at = {2009-11-10 10:27:34}, priority = {2}, title = {Information leakage in innovation outsourcing}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9310.2009.00574.x}, volume = {39}, year = {2009} }

TY - JOUR ID - citeulike:5943802 L3 - citeulike-article-id:5943802 N2 - This paper studies an R&D outsourcing contract between a firm and a contractor, considering the possibility that in the interim stage, the contractor might sell the innovation to a rival firm. Our result points out that due to the competition in the interim stage, the reward needed to prevent leakage will be pushed up to the extent that a profitable leakage-free contract does not exist. This result will also apply to cases considering revenue-sharing schemes and a disclosure punishment for commercial theft. Then, we demonstrate that in a competitive mechanism where the R&D firm hires two contractors together with a relative performance scheme, the disclosure punishment might help and there exists a perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium where the probability of information leakage is lower and the equilibrium reward is also cheaper than hiring one contractor. IS - 5 JF - R&D Management SN - 1467-9310 AD - Department of Economics, National Chengchi University, Taiwan. sjho@nccu.edu.tw EP - 443 TI - Information leakage in innovation outsourcing VL - 39 SP - 431 KW - information_management KW - innovation KW - security AU - Ho, Shirley PY - 2009/// UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9310.2009.00574.x ER -