A model for delimited information release Export

@misc{citeulike:1180371, abstract = {Much work on security-typed languages lacks a satisfactory account of intentional information release. In the context of confidentiality, a typical security guarantee provided by security type systems is noninterference, which allows no information flow from secret inputs to public outputs. However, many intuitively secure programs do allow some release, or declassification, of secret information (e.g., password checking, information purchase, and spreadsheet computation). ...}, author = {Sabelfeld, A. and Myers, A.}, citeulike-article-id = {1180371}, citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.11.1670}, keywords = {declassification, information\_flow}, posted-at = {2007-03-22 07:46:57}, priority = {3}, title = {A model for delimited information release}, url = {http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.11.1670}, year = {2004} }

TY - GEN ID - citeulike:1180371 L3 - citeulike-article-id:1180371 N2 - Much work on security-typed languages lacks a satisfactory account of intentional information release. In the context of confidentiality, a typical security guarantee provided by security type systems is noninterference, which allows no information flow from secret inputs to public outputs. However, many intuitively secure programs do allow some release, or declassification, of secret information (e.g., password checking, information purchase, and spreadsheet computation). ... TI - A model for delimited information release KW - declassification KW - information_flow AU - Sabelfeld, A AU - Myers, A PY - 2004/// UR - http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.11.1670 ER -