Optimal auction design Export

@article{myerson-81, abstract = {Considers the problem faced by a seller who has a single object to sell to one of several possible buyers, when the seller has imperfect information about how much the buyers might be willing to pay for the object. The seller's problem is to design an auction game which has a Nash equilibrium giving him the highest possible expected utility. Optimal auctions are derived for a wide class of auction design problems. [Journal Article; 14 Refs]}, author = {Myerson, R.}, citeulike-article-id = {161188}, citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6WS6-40417R4-179/2/f44ded75bd455529f12b470ea9cf2783}, journal = {Mathematics of Operations Research}, keywords = {economics, gametheory, markets}, number = {1}, pages = {58--73}, posted-at = {2005-04-15 02:12:59}, priority = {2}, title = {Optimal auction design}, url = {http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6WS6-40417R4-179/2/f44ded75bd455529f12b470ea9cf2783}, volume = {6}, year = {1981} }

TY - JOUR ID - myerson-81 L3 - citeulike-article-id:161188 N2 - Considers the problem faced by a seller who has a single object to sell to one of several possible buyers, when the seller has imperfect information about how much the buyers might be willing to pay for the object. The seller's problem is to design an auction game which has a Nash equilibrium giving him the highest possible expected utility. Optimal auctions are derived for a wide class of auction design problems. [Journal Article; 14 Refs] IS - 1 JF - Mathematics of Operations Research EP - 73 TI - Optimal auction design VL - 6 SP - 58 KW - economics KW - gametheory KW - markets AU - Myerson, R PY - 1981/// UR - http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6WS6-40417R4-179/2/f44ded75bd455529f12b470ea9cf2783 ER -