A Theory of Endogenous Coalition Structures Export

@article{citeulike:1277299, abstract = {Consider an environment with widespread externalities, and suppose that binding agreements can be written. We study coalition formation in such a setting. Our analysis proceeds by defining on a partition function an extensive-form bargaining game. We establish the existence of a stationary subgame perfect equilibrium for such a game. Our main results are concerned with the characterization of equilibriumcoalition structures. We develop an algorithm that generates (under certain conditions) an equilibrium coalition structure. Our characterization results are especially sharp forsymmetricpartition functions. In particular, we provide a uniqueness theorem and apply our results to a Cournot oligopoly.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C71, C72, C78, D62.}, author = {Ray, Debraj and Vohra, Rajiv}, citeulike-article-id = {1277299}, citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6WFW-45JC97N-V/2/bab9dabc9baa0ed60697e696710279b7}, journal = {Games and Economic Behavior}, keywords = {bargaining, coalitional, game\_theory}, month = {January}, number = {2}, pages = {286--336}, posted-at = {2007-05-04 14:30:00}, priority = {2}, title = {A Theory of Endogenous Coalition Structures}, url = {http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6WFW-45JC97N-V/2/bab9dabc9baa0ed60697e696710279b7}, volume = {26}, year = {1999} }

TY - JOUR ID - citeulike:1277299 L3 - citeulike-article-id:1277299 N2 - Consider an environment with widespread externalities, and suppose that binding agreements can be written. We study coalition formation in such a setting. Our analysis proceeds by defining on a partition function an extensive-form bargaining game. We establish the existence of a stationary subgame perfect equilibrium for such a game. Our main results are concerned with the characterization of equilibriumcoalition structures. We develop an algorithm that generates (under certain conditions) an equilibrium coalition structure. Our characterization results are especially sharp forsymmetricpartition functions. In particular, we provide a uniqueness theorem and apply our results to a Cournot oligopoly.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C71, C72, C78, D62. IS - 2 JF - Games and Economic Behavior EP - 336 TI - A Theory of Endogenous Coalition Structures VL - 26 SP - 286 KW - bargaining KW - coalitional KW - game_theory AU - Ray, Debraj AU - Vohra, Rajiv PY - 1999/01// UR - http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6WFW-45JC97N-V/2/bab9dabc9baa0ed60697e696710279b7 ER -