Social Fractionalization, Endogenous Property Rights, and Economic Development Export

@unpublished{lindner2004, abstract = {We investigate how social composition affects competitive and cooperative behavior in a linear growth model without a priori secure property rights. If a society is homogenous or highly fractionalized it is in the self-interest of people to cooperate. The first best allocation is enforced through trigger strategies, property rights turn out to be secure, and growth is independent from social fractionalization. If a society is polarized, i.e. if it consists of a small number of equally sized groups, property rights can turn out as unenforceable. If so, groups follow an exploitive strategy that leads to low investment and growth. In this case the rate of growth is continuously decreasing in the degree of fractionalization and possibly negative.}, author = {Lindner, Ines and Strulik, Holger}, citeulike-article-id = {1606029}, citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://www.econ.ku.dk/research/publications/pink/2004/0427.pdf}, journal = {Working paper}, keywords = {conflict, discrimination, fractionalization, identity, polarization}, month = {November}, posted-at = {2007-08-29 20:36:53}, priority = {2}, title = {Social Fractionalization, Endogenous Property Rights, and Economic Development}, url = {http://www.econ.ku.dk/research/publications/pink/2004/0427.pdf}, year = {2004} }

TY - UNPB ID - lindner2004 L3 - citeulike-article-id:1606029 N2 - We investigate how social composition affects competitive and cooperative behavior in a linear growth model without a priori secure property rights. If a society is homogenous or highly fractionalized it is in the self-interest of people to cooperate. The first best allocation is enforced through trigger strategies, property rights turn out to be secure, and growth is independent from social fractionalization. If a society is polarized, i.e. if it consists of a small number of equally sized groups, property rights can turn out as unenforceable. If so, groups follow an exploitive strategy that leads to low investment and growth. In this case the rate of growth is continuously decreasing in the degree of fractionalization and possibly negative. JF - Working paper TI - Social Fractionalization, Endogenous Property Rights, and Economic Development KW - conflict KW - discrimination KW - fractionalization KW - identity KW - polarization AU - Lindner, Ines AU - Strulik, Holger PY - 2004/11// UR - http://www.econ.ku.dk/research/publications/pink/2004/0427.pdf ER -