The impact of constitutional structures and collective and competitive veto points on income inequality in industrialized democracies Export

@article{citeulike:2227935, abstract = {This paper presents the first systematic, empirical examination of the impact of constitutional structures on income inequality among eighteen OECD countries. Our pooled time series/cross-sectional panel analysis (n = 18, t = 2) reveals that consensual political institutions are systematically related to lower income inequalities while the reverse is true for majoritarian political institutions. We also make a crucial distinction between 'collective' and 'competitive' veto points. Our multiple regression results provide strong evidence that collective veto points depress income inequalities while competitive veto points tend to widen the inequality of incomes. Thus, some institutional veto points have constraining effects on policy while others have 'enabling' effects.}, author = {Birchfield, Vicki and Crepaz, Markus M.}, citeulike-article-id = {2227935}, citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1006960528737}, day = {1}, doi = {10.1023/A:1006960528737}, journal = {European Journal of Political Research}, keywords = {oecd, politicaleconomy, welfarestate}, month = {October}, number = {2}, pages = {175--200}, posted-at = {2008-01-14 01:09:47}, priority = {3}, title = {The impact of constitutional structures and collective and competitive veto points on income inequality in industrialized democracies}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1006960528737}, volume = {34}, year = {1998} }

TY - JOUR ID - citeulike:2227935 L3 - citeulike-article-id:2227935 N2 - This paper presents the first systematic, empirical examination of the impact of constitutional structures on income inequality among eighteen OECD countries. Our pooled time series/cross-sectional panel analysis (n = 18, t = 2) reveals that consensual political institutions are systematically related to lower income inequalities while the reverse is true for majoritarian political institutions. We also make a crucial distinction between ‘collective’ and ‘competitive’ veto points. Our multiple regression results provide strong evidence that collective veto points depress income inequalities while competitive veto points tend to widen the inequality of incomes. Thus, some institutional veto points have constraining effects on policy while others have ‘enabling’ effects. IS - 2 JF - European Journal of Political Research EP - 200 TI - The impact of constitutional structures and collective and competitive veto points on income inequality in industrialized democracies VL - 34 SP - 175 KW - oecd KW - politicaleconomy KW - welfarestate AU - Birchfield, Vicki AU - Crepaz, Markus PY - 1998/10/01/ UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1006960528737 ER -