State Power and the Structure of International Trade Export

@article{citeulike:840908, abstract = {The structure of international trade, identified by the degree of openness for the movement of goods, can best be explained by a state-power theory of international political economy. This theory begins with the assumption that the nature of international economic movements is determined by states acting to maximize national goals. Four goals--aggregate national income, political power, social stability, and economic growth--can be systematically related to the degree of openness in the international trading system for states of different relative sizes and levels of development. This analysis leads to the conclusion that openness is most likely to exist when there is a hegemonic distribution of potential economic power. Time-series data on tariff levels, trade proportions, regional concentration, per capita income, national income, share of world trade, and share of world investment are then presented. The first three are used to describe the degree of openness in the trading system; the last four, the distribution of state power. The data suggest that the state-power theory should be amended to take into consideration domestic political constraints on state action.}, author = {Krasner, Stephen D.}, citeulike-article-id = {840908}, citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2009974}, journal = {World Politics}, keywords = {internationalrelations, trade}, number = {3}, pages = {317--347}, posted-at = {2008-01-15 01:49:22}, priority = {2}, title = {State Power and the Structure of International Trade}, url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2009974}, volume = {28}, year = {1976} }

TY - JOUR ID - citeulike:840908 L3 - citeulike-article-id:840908 N2 - The structure of international trade, identified by the degree of openness for the movement of goods, can best be explained by a state-power theory of international political economy. This theory begins with the assumption that the nature of international economic movements is determined by states acting to maximize national goals. Four goals--aggregate national income, political power, social stability, and economic growth--can be systematically related to the degree of openness in the international trading system for states of different relative sizes and levels of development. This analysis leads to the conclusion that openness is most likely to exist when there is a hegemonic distribution of potential economic power. Time-series data on tariff levels, trade proportions, regional concentration, per capita income, national income, share of world trade, and share of world investment are then presented. The first three are used to describe the degree of openness in the trading system; the last four, the distribution of state power. The data suggest that the state-power theory should be amended to take into consideration domestic political constraints on state action. IS - 3 JF - World Politics EP - 347 TI - State Power and the Structure of International Trade VL - 28 SP - 317 KW - internationalrelations KW - trade AU - Krasner, Stephen PY - 1976/// UR - http://www.jstor.org/stable/2009974 ER -