Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities Export

@article{milgrom-roberts-90, abstract = {We study a rich class of noncooperative games that includes models of oligopoly competition, macroeconomic coordination failures, arms races, bank runs, technology adoption and diffusion, R\&D competition, pretrial bargaining, coordination in teams, and many others. For all these games, the sets of pure strategy Nash equilibria, correlated equilibria, and rationalizable strategies have identical bounds. Also, for a class of models of dynamic adaptive choice behavior that encompasses both best-response dynamics and Bayesian learning, the players' choices lie eventually within the same bounds. These bounds are shown to vary monotonically with certain exogenous parameters.}, author = {Milgrom, Paul and Roberts, John}, citeulike-article-id = {120284}, citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2938316}, citeulike-linkout-1 = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2938316}, doi = {10.2307/2938316}, issn = {00129682}, journal = {Econometrica}, keywords = {410-1, aarmicro, microeconomics, piracol\_supermod, supermodularity}, number = {6}, pages = {1255--1277}, posted-at = {2005-03-10 22:55:22}, priority = {2}, publisher = {The Econometric Society}, title = {Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2938316}, volume = {58}, year = {1990} }

TY - JOUR ID - milgrom-roberts-90 L3 - citeulike-article-id:120284 N2 - We study a rich class of noncooperative games that includes models of oligopoly competition, macroeconomic coordination failures, arms races, bank runs, technology adoption and diffusion, R&D competition, pretrial bargaining, coordination in teams, and many others. For all these games, the sets of pure strategy Nash equilibria, correlated equilibria, and rationalizable strategies have identical bounds. Also, for a class of models of dynamic adaptive choice behavior that encompasses both best-response dynamics and Bayesian learning, the players' choices lie eventually within the same bounds. These bounds are shown to vary monotonically with certain exogenous parameters. IS - 6 JF - Econometrica SN - 00129682 EP - 1277 TI - Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities PB - The Econometric Society VL - 58 SP - 1255 KW - 410-1 KW - aarmicro KW - microeconomics KW - piracol_supermod KW - supermodularity AU - Milgrom, Paul AU - Roberts, John PY - 1990/// UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2938316 ER -