Bidding Rings Export

@article{citeulike:129607, abstract = {We characterize coordinated bidding strategies in two cases: a weak cartel, in which the bidders cannot make side-payments; and a strong cartel, in which the cartel members can exclude new entrants and can make transfer payments. The weak cartel can do no better than have its members submit identical bids. The strong cartel in effect reauctions the good among the cartel members.}, author = {Mcafee, R. Preston and Mcmillan, John}, citeulike-article-id = {129607}, citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2117323}, journal = {The American Economic Review}, keywords = {450-1, collusion}, number = {3}, pages = {579--599}, posted-at = {2007-10-12 21:55:46}, priority = {2}, title = {Bidding Rings}, url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2117323}, volume = {82}, year = {1992} }

TY - JOUR ID - citeulike:129607 L3 - citeulike-article-id:129607 N2 - We characterize coordinated bidding strategies in two cases: a weak cartel, in which the bidders cannot make side-payments; and a strong cartel, in which the cartel members can exclude new entrants and can make transfer payments. The weak cartel can do no better than have its members submit identical bids. The strong cartel in effect reauctions the good among the cartel members. IS - 3 JF - The American Economic Review EP - 599 TI - Bidding Rings VL - 82 SP - 579 KW - 450-1 KW - collusion AU - Mcafee, Preston AU - Mcmillan, John PY - 1992/// UR - http://www.jstor.org/stable/2117323 ER -