The Swing Voter's Curse Export

@article{citeulike:1322816, abstract = {We analyze two-candidate elections in which some voters are uncertain about the realization of a state variable that affects the utility of all voters. We demonstrate the existence of a swing voter's curse: less informed indifferent voters strictly prefer to abstain rather than vote for either candidate even when voting is costless. The swing voter's curse leads to the equilibrium result that a substantial fraction of the electorate will abstain even though all abstainers strictly prefer voting for one candidate over voting for another.}, author = {Feddersen, Timothy J. and Pesendorfer, Wolfgang}, citeulike-article-id = {1322816}, citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2118204}, citeulike-linkout-1 = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2118204}, doi = {10.2307/2118204}, journal = {The American Economic Review}, keywords = {courtecon, game\_theory, voting}, number = {3}, pages = {408--424}, posted-at = {2007-05-23 19:57:15}, priority = {0}, title = {The Swing Voter's Curse}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2118204}, volume = {86}, year = {1996} }

TY - JOUR ID - citeulike:1322816 L3 - citeulike-article-id:1322816 N2 - We analyze two-candidate elections in which some voters are uncertain about the realization of a state variable that affects the utility of all voters. We demonstrate the existence of a swing voter's curse: less informed indifferent voters strictly prefer to abstain rather than vote for either candidate even when voting is costless. The swing voter's curse leads to the equilibrium result that a substantial fraction of the electorate will abstain even though all abstainers strictly prefer voting for one candidate over voting for another. IS - 3 JF - The American Economic Review EP - 424 TI - The Swing Voter's Curse VL - 86 SP - 408 KW - courtecon KW - game_theory KW - voting AU - Feddersen, Timothy AU - Pesendorfer, Wolfgang PY - 1996/// UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2118204 ER -