Incentives and incomplete information Export

@article{daspremont-gerard-79, abstract = {The problem of incentives for correct revelation in a collective decision model is presented as a game with incomplete information. Two approaches to incomplete information are used, a first where the individual beliefs are not introduced and a second where they are. In the first approach it is recalled that the mechanisms for which the solution to the incentive problem is in dominant strategies lead in general to a budgetary problem for the central agency. For these mechanisms a uniqueness property is demonstrated. In the second approach it is shown that if a compatibility condition is imposed on the individual beliefs and if a Bayesian solution is given to the incentive problem, then it is possible to avoid the budgetary problem.}, author = {D'aspremont, Claude and Gerard-Varet, Louis-Andre}, citeulike-article-id = {1322914}, citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V76-45DN09T-7W/2/fe24af1fc886769e7d3da8ef17fba44f}, journal = {Journal of Public Economics}, keywords = {410-3, mechanism\_design}, month = {February}, number = {1}, pages = {25--45}, posted-at = {2007-05-23 22:29:19}, priority = {2}, title = {Incentives and incomplete information}, url = {http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V76-45DN09T-7W/2/fe24af1fc886769e7d3da8ef17fba44f}, volume = {11}, year = {1979} }

TY - JOUR ID - daspremont-gerard-79 L3 - citeulike-article-id:1322914 N2 - The problem of incentives for correct revelation in a collective decision model is presented as a game with incomplete information. Two approaches to incomplete information are used, a first where the individual beliefs are not introduced and a second where they are. In the first approach it is recalled that the mechanisms for which the solution to the incentive problem is in dominant strategies lead in general to a budgetary problem for the central agency. For these mechanisms a uniqueness property is demonstrated. In the second approach it is shown that if a compatibility condition is imposed on the individual beliefs and if a Bayesian solution is given to the incentive problem, then it is possible to avoid the budgetary problem. IS - 1 JF - Journal of Public Economics EP - 45 TI - Incentives and incomplete information VL - 11 SP - 25 KW - 410-3 KW - mechanism_design AU - D'aspremont, Claude AU - Gerard-Varet, Louis-Andre PY - 1979/02// UR - http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V76-45DN09T-7W/2/fe24af1fc886769e7d3da8ef17fba44f ER -