Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading Export

@article{myerson-satterthwaite-83, abstract = {We consider bargaining problems between one buyer and one seller for a single object. The seller's valuation and the buyer's valuation for the object are assumed to be independent random variables, and each individual's valuation is unknown to the other. We characterize the set of allocation mechanisms that are Bayesian incentive compatible and individually rational, and show the general impossibility of ex post efficient mechanisms without outside subsidies. For a wide class of problems we show how to compute mechanisms that maximize expected total gains from trade, and mechanisms that can maximize a broker's expected profit.}, author = {Myerson, Roger B. and Satterthwaite, Mark A.}, citeulike-article-id = {1323040}, citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6WJ3-4CYGD4J-13J/2/f55bd08eab27d651dc3e8992df2725b4}, journal = {Journal of Economic Theory}, keywords = {410-3, mechanism\_design, perfcomp}, month = {April}, number = {2}, pages = {265--281}, posted-at = {2007-05-23 23:27:02}, priority = {2}, title = {Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading}, url = {http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6WJ3-4CYGD4J-13J/2/f55bd08eab27d651dc3e8992df2725b4}, volume = {29}, year = {1983} }

TY - JOUR ID - myerson-satterthwaite-83 L3 - citeulike-article-id:1323040 N2 - We consider bargaining problems between one buyer and one seller for a single object. The seller's valuation and the buyer's valuation for the object are assumed to be independent random variables, and each individual's valuation is unknown to the other. We characterize the set of allocation mechanisms that are Bayesian incentive compatible and individually rational, and show the general impossibility of ex post efficient mechanisms without outside subsidies. For a wide class of problems we show how to compute mechanisms that maximize expected total gains from trade, and mechanisms that can maximize a broker's expected profit. IS - 2 JF - Journal of Economic Theory EP - 281 TI - Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading VL - 29 SP - 265 KW - 410-3 KW - mechanism_design KW - perfcomp AU - Myerson, Roger AU - Satterthwaite, Mark PY - 1983/04// UR - http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6WJ3-4CYGD4J-13J/2/f55bd08eab27d651dc3e8992df2725b4 ER -