Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently Export

@article{cramton-gibbons-klemperer-87, abstract = {Several partners jointly own an asset that may be traded among them. Each partner has a valuation for the asset; the valuations are known privately and drawn independently from a common probability distribution. We characterize the set of all incentive-compatible and interim-individually-rational trading mechanisms, and give a simple necessary and sufficient condition for such mechanisms to dissolve the partnership ex post efficiently. A bidding game is constructed that achieves such dissolution whenever it is possible. Despite incomplete information about the valuation of the asset, a partnership can be dissolved ex post efficiently provided no single partner owns too large a share; this contrasts with Myerson and Satterthwaite's result that ex post efficiency cannot be achieved when the asset is owned by a single party.}, author = {Cramton, Peter and Gibbons, Robert and Klemperer, Paul}, citeulike-article-id = {1323130}, citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/1913602}, journal = {Econometrica}, keywords = {410-3, mechanism\_design}, number = {3}, pages = {615--632}, posted-at = {2007-05-24 00:13:34}, priority = {2}, title = {Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently}, url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/1913602}, volume = {55}, year = {1987} }

TY - JOUR ID - cramton-gibbons-klemperer-87 L3 - citeulike-article-id:1323130 N2 - Several partners jointly own an asset that may be traded among them. Each partner has a valuation for the asset; the valuations are known privately and drawn independently from a common probability distribution. We characterize the set of all incentive-compatible and interim-individually-rational trading mechanisms, and give a simple necessary and sufficient condition for such mechanisms to dissolve the partnership ex post efficiently. A bidding game is constructed that achieves such dissolution whenever it is possible. Despite incomplete information about the valuation of the asset, a partnership can be dissolved ex post efficiently provided no single partner owns too large a share; this contrasts with Myerson and Satterthwaite's result that ex post efficiency cannot be achieved when the asset is owned by a single party. IS - 3 JF - Econometrica EP - 632 TI - Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently VL - 55 SP - 615 KW - 410-3 KW - mechanism_design AU - Cramton, Peter AU - Gibbons, Robert AU - Klemperer, Paul PY - 1987/// UR - http://www.jstor.org/stable/1913602 ER -