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Mixed equilibria are unstable in games of strategic complements Export

Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 118, No. 1. (September 2004), pp. 61-79.

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aarmicro microeconomics piracol_supermod supermodularity

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In games with strict strategic complementarities, properly mixed Nash equilibria--equilibria that are not in pure strategies--are unstable for a broad class of learning dynamics.


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