Tax competition and Leviathan Export

@article{citeulike:150613, abstract = {Attitudes towards downward pressure on tax rates from international tax competition depend on attitudes towards government. This paper synthesises the two extremes which, as in other areas of public finance, have dominated the debate, typically being presented as stark alternatives: the view of government as a Leviathan (from which tax competition emerges as a useful constraint on policy-makers) and the view of government as a benevolent maximiser of their citizens' welfare (from which it emerges as a source of inefficiency). Conditions are derived under which, when policy-makers are neither entirely benevolent nor wholly self-serving, tax coordination benefits the representative citizen.}, author = {Edwards, Jeremy and Keen, Michael}, citeulike-article-id = {150613}, citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0014-2921(95)00057-7}, citeulike-linkout-1 = {http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V64-3VW1D0Y-6/2/41000a05951f6389e18c6b07154c5a75}, doi = {10.1016/0014-2921(95)00057-7}, journal = {European Economic Review}, keywords = {aarpubec, public\_choice, public\_economics}, month = {January}, number = {1}, pages = {113--134}, posted-at = {2005-04-06 22:06:53}, priority = {2}, title = {Tax competition and Leviathan}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0014-2921(95)00057-7}, volume = {40}, year = {1996} }

TY - JOUR ID - citeulike:150613 L3 - citeulike-article-id:150613 N2 - Attitudes towards downward pressure on tax rates from international tax competition depend on attitudes towards government. This paper synthesises the two extremes which, as in other areas of public finance, have dominated the debate, typically being presented as stark alternatives: the view of government as a Leviathan (from which tax competition emerges as a useful constraint on policy-makers) and the view of government as a benevolent maximiser of their citizens' welfare (from which it emerges as a source of inefficiency). Conditions are derived under which, when policy-makers are neither entirely benevolent nor wholly self-serving, tax coordination benefits the representative citizen. IS - 1 JF - European Economic Review EP - 134 TI - Tax competition and Leviathan VL - 40 SP - 113 KW - aarpubec KW - public_choice KW - public_economics AU - Edwards, Jeremy AU - Keen, Michael PY - 1996/01// UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0014-2921(95)00057-7 ER -