Noncooperative Collusion in Durable Goods Oligopoly Export

@article{citeulike:1761873, abstract = {Coase conjectured that a durable-goods monopolist who can make offers to sell arbitrarily frequently will lose the ability to extract positive profits. This result, which has now been proved, can be attributed to the inability of the monopolist to commit to maintaining sufficiently high prices in the near future. For the case of durable-goods oligopoly, we show that letting the firms make offers arbitrarily frequently enhances their ability to commit to high prices and in the limit enables the firms to enjoy total market profits equal to the full commitment (one-shot) monopoly profit.}, author = {Gul, Faruk}, citeulike-article-id = {1761873}, citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2555550}, journal = {The RAND Journal of Economics}, keywords = {450-1, collusion}, number = {2}, pages = {248--254}, posted-at = {2007-10-12 21:56:05}, priority = {2}, title = {Noncooperative Collusion in Durable Goods Oligopoly}, url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2555550}, volume = {18}, year = {1987} }

TY - JOUR ID - citeulike:1761873 L3 - citeulike-article-id:1761873 N2 - Coase conjectured that a durable-goods monopolist who can make offers to sell arbitrarily frequently will lose the ability to extract positive profits. This result, which has now been proved, can be attributed to the inability of the monopolist to commit to maintaining sufficiently high prices in the near future. For the case of durable-goods oligopoly, we show that letting the firms make offers arbitrarily frequently enhances their ability to commit to high prices and in the limit enables the firms to enjoy total market profits equal to the full commitment (one-shot) monopoly profit. IS - 2 JF - The RAND Journal of Economics EP - 254 TI - Noncooperative Collusion in Durable Goods Oligopoly VL - 18 SP - 248 KW - 450-1 KW - collusion AU - Gul, Faruk PY - 1987/// UR - http://www.jstor.org/stable/2555550 ER -