The Access Pricing Problem with Deregulation: A Note Export

@article{citeulike:1761903, abstract = {This note extends the analysis of Armstrong, Doyle and Vickers \&\#91;1996\&\#93; to the case of retail price deregulation. It is shown (i) that the optimal access price may be above, below, or (in the linear case) equal to marginal cost, (ii) that optimal regulation of the margin between the retail price and the access price entails the ECPR, and (iii) that welfare and entrant profit are higher when the level of the access price, rather than the margin, is regulated.}, author = {Armstrong, Mark}, citeulike-article-id = {1761903}, citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/joie/1998/00000046/00000001/art00006}, keywords = {450-1}, month = {March}, pages = {115--121}, posted-at = {2007-10-12 22:05:20}, priority = {2}, title = {The Access Pricing Problem with Deregulation: A Note}, url = {http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/joie/1998/00000046/00000001/art00006} }

TY - JOUR ID - citeulike:1761903 L3 - citeulike-article-id:1761903 N2 - This note extends the analysis of Armstrong, Doyle and Vickers [1996] to the case of retail price deregulation. It is shown (i) that the optimal access price may be above, below, or (in the linear case) equal to marginal cost, (ii) that optimal regulation of the margin between the retail price and the access price entails the ECPR, and (iii) that welfare and entrant profit are higher when the level of the access price, rather than the margin, is regulated. EP - 121 TI - The Access Pricing Problem with Deregulation: A Note SP - 115 KW - 450-1 AU - Armstrong, Mark UR - http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/joie/1998/00000046/00000001/art00006 ER -