Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed Export

@article{fudenberg-levine-92, abstract = {This paper studies reputation effects in games with a single long-run player whose choice of stage-game strategy is imperfectly observed by his opponents. We obtain lower and upper bounds on the long-run player's payoff in any Nash equilibrium of the game. If the long-run player's stage-game strategy is statistically identified by the observed outcomes, then for generic payoffs the upper and lower bounds both converge, as the discount factor tends to 1, to the long-run player's Stackelberg payoff, which is the most he could obtain by publicly committing himself to any strategy.}, author = {Fudenberg, Drew and Levine, David K.}, citeulike-article-id = {1912188}, citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2297864}, journal = {The Review of Economic Studies}, keywords = {412-1, reputations}, number = {3}, pages = {561--579}, posted-at = {2007-11-14 04:37:21}, priority = {2}, title = {Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed}, url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2297864}, volume = {59}, year = {1992} }

TY - JOUR ID - fudenberg-levine-92 L3 - citeulike-article-id:1912188 N2 - This paper studies reputation effects in games with a single long-run player whose choice of stage-game strategy is imperfectly observed by his opponents. We obtain lower and upper bounds on the long-run player's payoff in any Nash equilibrium of the game. If the long-run player's stage-game strategy is statistically identified by the observed outcomes, then for generic payoffs the upper and lower bounds both converge, as the discount factor tends to 1, to the long-run player's Stackelberg payoff, which is the most he could obtain by publicly committing himself to any strategy. IS - 3 JF - The Review of Economic Studies EP - 579 TI - Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed VL - 59 SP - 561 KW - 412-1 KW - reputations AU - Fudenberg, Drew AU - Levine, David PY - 1992/// UR - http://www.jstor.org/stable/2297864 ER -