Turnpike properties of capital accumulation games Export

@article{citeulike:191310, abstract = {A differential game is considered in which players accumulate capital, their payoff functions depend upon the capital stocks of both players and their cost functions are convex. Previous existence and stability results are relied upon to show that the game, under an additional assumption, possesses the following properties: (a) Every equilibrium of the infinite horizon game converges to the unique stationary equilibrium. (b) For a time horizon long enough the finite horizon equilibrium stays in the neighborhood of the infinite horizon equilibrium except for some final time. (c) For a time horizon long enough the finite horizon equilibrium stays in the neighborhood of the stationary equilibrium except for some initial and final time.}, author = {Fershtman, Chaim and Muller, Eitan}, citeulike-article-id = {191310}, citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(86)90094-3}, citeulike-linkout-1 = {http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6WJ3-4CYH3V3-B/2/c32882989d6ab64720a9b0285a683de6}, doi = {10.1016/0022-0531(86)90094-3}, journal = {Journal of Economic Theory}, keywords = {aardiffgames, capital\_accumulation}, month = {February}, number = {1}, pages = {167--177}, posted-at = {2005-05-10 22:19:00}, priority = {2}, title = {Turnpike properties of capital accumulation games}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(86)90094-3}, volume = {38}, year = {1986} }

TY - JOUR ID - citeulike:191310 L3 - citeulike-article-id:191310 N2 - A differential game is considered in which players accumulate capital, their payoff functions depend upon the capital stocks of both players and their cost functions are convex. Previous existence and stability results are relied upon to show that the game, under an additional assumption, possesses the following properties: (a) Every equilibrium of the infinite horizon game converges to the unique stationary equilibrium. (b) For a time horizon long enough the finite horizon equilibrium stays in the neighborhood of the infinite horizon equilibrium except for some final time. (c) For a time horizon long enough the finite horizon equilibrium stays in the neighborhood of the stationary equilibrium except for some initial and final time. IS - 1 JF - Journal of Economic Theory EP - 177 TI - Turnpike properties of capital accumulation games VL - 38 SP - 167 KW - aardiffgames KW - capital_accumulation AU - Fershtman, Chaim AU - Muller, Eitan PY - 1986/02// UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(86)90094-3 ER -