Bargaining without a Common Prior: An Immediate Agreement Theorem Export

@article{yildiz-2003, abstract = {In sequential bargaining models without outside options, each player's bargaining power is ultimately determined by which player will make an offer and when. This paper analyzes a sequential bargaining model in which players may hold different beliefs about which player will make an offer and when. Excessive optimism about making offers in the future can cause delays in agreement. The main result states that, despite this, if players will remain sufficiently optimistic for a sufficiently long future, then in equilibrium they will agree immediately. This result is also extended to other canonical models of optimism.}, author = {Yildiz, Muhamet}, citeulike-article-id = {1941427}, citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1555522}, citeulike-linkout-1 = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/1555522}, doi = {10.2307/1555522}, journal = {Econometrica}, keywords = {412-1, bargaining}, number = {3}, pages = {793--811}, posted-at = {2007-11-20 05:37:39}, priority = {2}, title = {Bargaining without a Common Prior: An Immediate Agreement Theorem}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1555522}, volume = {71}, year = {2003} }

TY - JOUR ID - yildiz-2003 L3 - citeulike-article-id:1941427 N2 - In sequential bargaining models without outside options, each player's bargaining power is ultimately determined by which player will make an offer and when. This paper analyzes a sequential bargaining model in which players may hold different beliefs about which player will make an offer and when. Excessive optimism about making offers in the future can cause delays in agreement. The main result states that, despite this, if players will remain sufficiently optimistic for a sufficiently long future, then in equilibrium they will agree immediately. This result is also extended to other canonical models of optimism. IS - 3 JF - Econometrica EP - 811 TI - Bargaining without a Common Prior: An Immediate Agreement Theorem VL - 71 SP - 793 KW - 412-1 KW - bargaining AU - Yildiz, Muhamet PY - 2003/// UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1555522 ER -