The Dynamics of Pretrial Negotiation Export

@article{spier-92, abstract = {A model of sequential bargaining with one-sided incomplete information is analyzed where, if an agreement is not reached, the agents go to court. A \"deadline effect\" emerges where much settlement occurs just prior to the trial, and many cases proceed to court. If fixed costs are incurred during each bargaining period, a \"U-shaped\" pattern of settlement emerges. These patterns persist in the limit as the time between offers approaches zero. A model with an endogenous trial date is also considered, and it is shown that even with complete information, there exist inefficient equilibria where disputes are resolved in court.}, author = {Spier, Kathryn E.}, citeulike-article-id = {2189344}, citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2297927}, journal = {The Review of Economic Studies}, keywords = {412-1}, number = {1}, pages = {93--108}, posted-at = {2008-01-02 18:55:27}, priority = {2}, title = {The Dynamics of Pretrial Negotiation}, url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2297927}, volume = {59}, year = {1992} }

TY - JOUR ID - spier-92 L3 - citeulike-article-id:2189344 N2 - A model of sequential bargaining with one-sided incomplete information is analyzed where, if an agreement is not reached, the agents go to court. A "deadline effect" emerges where much settlement occurs just prior to the trial, and many cases proceed to court. If fixed costs are incurred during each bargaining period, a "U-shaped" pattern of settlement emerges. These patterns persist in the limit as the time between offers approaches zero. A model with an endogenous trial date is also considered, and it is shown that even with complete information, there exist inefficient equilibria where disputes are resolved in court. IS - 1 JF - The Review of Economic Studies EP - 108 TI - The Dynamics of Pretrial Negotiation VL - 59 SP - 93 KW - 412-1 AU - Spier, Kathryn PY - 1992/// UR - http://www.jstor.org/stable/2297927 ER -