Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria Export

@article{cho-kreps-1987-qjoe, abstract = {Games in which one party conveys private information to a second through messages typically admit large numbers of sequential equilibria, as the second party may entertain a wealth of beliefs in response to out-of-equilibrium messages. By restricting those out-of-equilibrium beliefs, one can sometimes eliminate many unintuitive equilibria. We present a number of formal restrictions of this sort, investigate their behavior in specific examples, and relate these restrictions to Kohlberg and Mertens' notion of stability.}, author = {Cho, In K. and Kreps, David M.}, citeulike-article-id = {3754071}, citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/1885060}, journal = {The Quarterly Journal of Economics}, keywords = {415-1}, number = {2}, pages = {179--221}, posted-at = {2008-12-08 03:49:40}, priority = {2}, publisher = {The MIT Press}, title = {Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria}, url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/1885060}, volume = {102}, year = {1987} }

TY - JOUR ID - cho-kreps-1987-qjoe L3 - citeulike-article-id:3754071 N2 - Games in which one party conveys private information to a second through messages typically admit large numbers of sequential equilibria, as the second party may entertain a wealth of beliefs in response to out-of-equilibrium messages. By restricting those out-of-equilibrium beliefs, one can sometimes eliminate many unintuitive equilibria. We present a number of formal restrictions of this sort, investigate their behavior in specific examples, and relate these restrictions to Kohlberg and Mertens' notion of stability. IS - 2 JF - The Quarterly Journal of Economics EP - 221 TI - Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria PB - The MIT Press VL - 102 SP - 179 KW - 415-1 AU - Cho, In AU - Kreps, David PY - 1987/// UR - http://www.jstor.org/stable/1885060 ER -