The Economics of Career Concerns, Part I: Comparing Information Structures Export

@article{citeulike:489954, abstract = {Many incentives in organizations arise not through explicit formal incentive contracts but rather implicitly through career concerns. This paper models career concerns through agents trying to manipulate the market assessment of their future productivity. The information flow from current actions to market assessment is therefore crucial in determining the nature of these incentives. Improved information may either increase or reduce incentives. The impact of information provides a major distinction between the explicit and implicit incentives model. The paper derives general results on comparisons of information structures which serve as counterparts to the standard results on information structures in the principal-agent model: sufficient statistic, impact of a Blackwell garbling, comparison of inclusive information structures.}, author = {Dewatripont, Mathias and Jewitt, Ian and Tirole, Jean}, citeulike-article-id = {489954}, citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2566955}, journal = {The Review of Economic Studies}, keywords = {career, contract\_theory}, number = {1}, pages = {183--198}, posted-at = {2006-02-02 20:19:30}, priority = {2}, title = {The Economics of Career Concerns, Part I: Comparing Information Structures}, url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2566955}, volume = {66}, year = {1999} }

TY - JOUR ID - citeulike:489954 L3 - citeulike-article-id:489954 N2 - Many incentives in organizations arise not through explicit formal incentive contracts but rather implicitly through career concerns. This paper models career concerns through agents trying to manipulate the market assessment of their future productivity. The information flow from current actions to market assessment is therefore crucial in determining the nature of these incentives. Improved information may either increase or reduce incentives. The impact of information provides a major distinction between the explicit and implicit incentives model. The paper derives general results on comparisons of information structures which serve as counterparts to the standard results on information structures in the principal-agent model: sufficient statistic, impact of a Blackwell garbling, comparison of inclusive information structures. IS - 1 JF - The Review of Economic Studies EP - 198 TI - The Economics of Career Concerns, Part I: Comparing Information Structures VL - 66 SP - 183 KW - career KW - contract_theory AU - Dewatripont, Mathias AU - Jewitt, Ian AU - Tirole, Jean PY - 1999/// UR - http://www.jstor.org/stable/2566955 ER -