The Economics of Career Concerns, Part II: Application to Missions and Accountability of Government Agencies Export

@article{citeulike:489956, abstract = {The paper uses a simple multitask career concern model in order to analyse the incentives of government agencies' officials. Incentives are impaired by the agency pursuing multiple missions. A lack of focus is even more problematic in the case of fuzzy missions, that is when outsiders are uncertain about the exact nature of the missions actually pursued by the agency. Consequently agencies pursuing multiple missions receive less autonomy. The paper further shows that professionalization creates a sense of mission for the agency, and that the specialization of officials raises their incentives. Last, the paper compares its predictions with the stylized facts on Government bureaucracies.}, author = {Dewatripont, Mathias and Jewitt, Ian and Tirole, Jean}, citeulike-article-id = {489956}, citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2566956}, journal = {The Review of Economic Studies}, keywords = {career, contract\_theory}, number = {1}, pages = {199--217}, posted-at = {2006-02-02 20:19:38}, priority = {2}, title = {The Economics of Career Concerns, Part II: Application to Missions and Accountability of Government Agencies}, url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2566956}, volume = {66}, year = {1999} }

TY - JOUR ID - citeulike:489956 L3 - citeulike-article-id:489956 N2 - The paper uses a simple multitask career concern model in order to analyse the incentives of government agencies' officials. Incentives are impaired by the agency pursuing multiple missions. A lack of focus is even more problematic in the case of fuzzy missions, that is when outsiders are uncertain about the exact nature of the missions actually pursued by the agency. Consequently agencies pursuing multiple missions receive less autonomy. The paper further shows that professionalization creates a sense of mission for the agency, and that the specialization of officials raises their incentives. Last, the paper compares its predictions with the stylized facts on Government bureaucracies. IS - 1 JF - The Review of Economic Studies EP - 217 TI - The Economics of Career Concerns, Part II: Application to Missions and Accountability of Government Agencies VL - 66 SP - 199 KW - career KW - contract_theory AU - Dewatripont, Mathias AU - Jewitt, Ian AU - Tirole, Jean PY - 1999/// UR - http://www.jstor.org/stable/2566956 ER -