Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion

@article{citeulike:489963, abstract = {In recent years, the \"leverage theory\" of tied good sales has faced heavy and influential criticism. In an important sense, though, the models used by its critics are actually incapable of addressing the leverage theory's central concerns. Here I reconsider the leverage hypothesis and argue that tying can indeed serve as a mechanism for leveraging market power. The mechanism through which this leverage occurs, its profitability, and its welfare implications are discussed in detail.}, author = {Whinston, Michael D.}, citeulike-article-id = {489963}, journal = {The American Economic Review}, keywords = {bundling, io, tartumicropapers}, number = {4}, pages = {837--859}, posted-at = {2006-02-02 20:34:02}, priority = {2}, title = {Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion}, url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/2006711}, volume = {80}, year = {1990} }

TY - JOUR ID - citeulike:489963 L3 - citeulike-article-id:489963 N2 - In recent years, the "leverage theory" of tied good sales has faced heavy and influential criticism. In an important sense, though, the models used by its critics are actually incapable of addressing the leverage theory's central concerns. Here I reconsider the leverage hypothesis and argue that tying can indeed serve as a mechanism for leveraging market power. The mechanism through which this leverage occurs, its profitability, and its welfare implications are discussed in detail. IS - 4 JF - The American Economic Review EP - 859 TI - Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion VL - 80 SP - 837 KW - bundling KW - io KW - tartumicropapers AU - Whinston, Michael PY - 1990/// UR - http://www.jstor.org/stable/2006711 ER -