Competition among Sellers Who Offer Auctions Instead of Prices Export

@article{peters-severinov-97, abstract = {In this paper we study a large market in which sellers compete by offering auctions to buyers instead of simple fixed price contracts. Two variants of the model are studied. One extends a model first analyzed by Wolinsky ( Rev. Econ. Stud. 55 (1988), 71-84) in which buyers learn their valuations only after meeting sellers. The other variant extends the model of McAfee ( Econometrica 61 (1993), 1281-1312) in which buyers know their valuations before they choose among available auctions. The equilibrium array of auctions is characterized for each case and the efficiency properties of the equilibria are analyzed. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D41, D44, D82.}, author = {Peters, M. and Severinov, S.}, citeulike-article-id = {4949227}, citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/ap/et/1997/00000075/00000001/art02278}, citeulike-linkout-1 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1997.2278}, doi = {10.1006/jeth.1997.2278}, issn = {0022-0531}, journal = {Journal of Economic Theory}, keywords = {competingauctions, ds}, month = {July}, pages = {141--179}, posted-at = {2009-06-25 01:21:54}, priority = {2}, publisher = {Academic Press}, title = {Competition among Sellers Who Offer Auctions Instead of Prices}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1997.2278}, year = {1997} }

TY - JOUR ID - peters-severinov-97 L3 - citeulike-article-id:4949227 N2 - In this paper we study a large market in which sellers compete by offering auctions to buyers instead of simple fixed price contracts. Two variants of the model are studied. One extends a model first analyzed by Wolinsky ( Rev. Econ. Stud. 55 (1988), 71-84) in which buyers learn their valuations only after meeting sellers. The other variant extends the model of McAfee ( Econometrica 61 (1993), 1281-1312) in which buyers know their valuations before they choose among available auctions. The equilibrium array of auctions is characterized for each case and the efficiency properties of the equilibria are analyzed. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D41, D44, D82. JF - Journal of Economic Theory SN - 0022-0531 EP - 179 TI - Competition among Sellers Who Offer Auctions Instead of Prices PB - Academic Press SP - 141 KW - competingauctions KW - ds AU - Peters, M AU - Severinov, S PY - 1997/07// UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1997.2278 ER -