Imperfect Competition in Auction Designs Export

@article{burguet-sakovics-99, abstract = {We study the competition between two owners of identical goods who wish to sell them to a pool of potential buyers. The sellers compete simultaneously setting reserve prices for their second price sealed bid auctions. Upon observing the set reserve prices, the buyers decide simultaneously in which auction to bid. We show that this game has (at least) one equilibrium and that all equilibria are inefficient: reserve prices are not driven to zero (cost). We also discuss where and why the parallel between optimal auction design and optimal pricing in the case of monopoly breaks down for oligopoly.}, address = {Instituto de Anlisis Econmico, Spain ; Instituto de Anlisis Econmico, Spain}, author = {Burguet, Roberto and Sakovics, Jozsef}, citeulike-article-id = {4949289}, citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-2354.00013}, citeulike-linkout-1 = {http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/abstract/119066971/ABSTRACT}, doi = {10.1111/1468-2354.00013}, journal = {International Economic Review}, keywords = {competingauctions, ds}, number = {1}, pages = {231--247}, posted-at = {2009-06-25 01:29:35}, priority = {2}, title = {Imperfect Competition in Auction Designs}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-2354.00013}, volume = {40}, year = {1999} }

TY - JOUR ID - burguet-sakovics-99 L3 - citeulike-article-id:4949289 N2 - We study the competition between two owners of identical goods who wish to sell them to a pool of potential buyers. The sellers compete simultaneously setting reserve prices for their second price sealed bid auctions. Upon observing the set reserve prices, the buyers decide simultaneously in which auction to bid. We show that this game has (at least) one equilibrium and that all equilibria are inefficient: reserve prices are not driven to zero (cost). We also discuss where and why the parallel between optimal auction design and optimal pricing in the case of monopoly breaks down for oligopoly. IS - 1 JF - International Economic Review AD - Instituto de Anlisis Econmico, Spain ; Instituto de Anlisis Econmico, Spain EP - 247 TI - Imperfect Competition in Auction Designs VL - 40 SP - 231 KW - competingauctions KW - ds AU - Burguet, Roberto AU - Sakovics, Jozsef PY - 1999/// UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1468-2354.00013 ER -