Moral Hazard and Observability

@article{holmstrom-79, abstract = {The role of imperfect information in a principal-agent relationship subject to moral hazard is considered. A necessary and sufficient condition for imperfect information to improve on contracts based on the payoff alone is derived, and a characterization of the optimal use of such information is given.}, author = {Holmstrom, Bengt}, citeulike-article-id = {515193}, doi = {10.2307/3003320}, journal = {The Bell Journal of Economics}, keywords = {moral\_hazard, tartumicro}, number = {1}, pages = {74--91}, posted-at = {2006-02-21 22:06:54}, priority = {2}, title = {Moral Hazard and Observability}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3003320}, volume = {10}, year = {1979} }

TY - JOUR ID - holmstrom-79 L3 - citeulike-article-id:515193 N2 - The role of imperfect information in a principal-agent relationship subject to moral hazard is considered. A necessary and sufficient condition for imperfect information to improve on contracts based on the payoff alone is derived, and a characterization of the optimal use of such information is given. IS - 1 JF - The Bell Journal of Economics EP - 91 TI - Moral Hazard and Observability VL - 10 SP - 74 KW - moral_hazard KW - tartumicro AU - Holmstrom, Bengt PY - 1979/// UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3003320 ER -