Who pays when auction rules are bent? Export

@article{mcadams-schwarz-2007, abstract = {In many negotiations, rules are soft in the sense that the seller and/or buyers may break them at some cost. When buyers have private values, we show that the cost of such opportunistic behavior (whether by the buyers or the seller) is borne entirely by the seller in equilibrium, in the form of lower revenues. Consequently, the seller is willing to pay an auctioneer to credibly commit to a mechanism in which no one has the ability or the incentive to break the rules. Examples of ” costly rule bending” considered here include hiring shill bidders and trying to learn others' bids before making one's own.}, author = {Mcadams, D. and Schwarz, M.}, citeulike-article-id = {5297096}, citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2006.09.004}, citeulike-linkout-1 = {http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0167718706001172}, doi = {10.1016/j.ijindorg.2006.09.004}, issn = {01677187}, journal = {International Journal of Industrial Organization}, keywords = {ds}, month = {October}, number = {5}, pages = {1144--1157}, posted-at = {2009-07-29 02:26:44}, priority = {2}, title = {Who pays when auction rules are bent?}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2006.09.004}, volume = {25}, year = {2007} }

TY - JOUR ID - mcadams-schwarz-2007 L3 - citeulike-article-id:5297096 N2 - In many negotiations, rules are soft in the sense that the seller and/or buyers may break them at some cost. When buyers have private values, we show that the cost of such opportunistic behavior (whether by the buyers or the seller) is borne entirely by the seller in equilibrium, in the form of lower revenues. Consequently, the seller is willing to pay an auctioneer to credibly commit to a mechanism in which no one has the ability or the incentive to break the rules. Examples of “costly rule bending” considered here include hiring shill bidders and trying to learn others' bids before making one's own. IS - 5 JF - International Journal of Industrial Organization SN - 01677187 EP - 1157 TI - Who pays when auction rules are bent? VL - 25 SP - 1144 KW - ds AU - Mcadams, D AU - Schwarz, M PY - 2007/10// UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2006.09.004 ER -