Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria

@article{cho-kreps-87, abstract = {Games in which one party conveys private information to a second through messages typically admit large numbers of sequential equilibria, as the second party may entertain a wealth of beliefs in response to out-of-equilibrium messages. By restricting those out-of-equilibrium beliefs, one can sometimes eliminate many unintuitive equilibria. We present a number of formal restrictions of this sort, investigate their behavior in specific examples, and relate these restrictions to Kohlberg and Mertens' notion of stability.}, author = {Cho, In-Koo and Kreps, David M. }, citeulike-article-id = {600937}, journal = {The Quarterly Journal of Economics}, keywords = {signaling, tartumicro}, number = {2}, pages = {179--222}, posted-at = {2006-04-26 06:51:31}, priority = {2}, title = {Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria}, url = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/1885060}, volume = {102}, year = {1987} }

TY - JOUR ID - cho-kreps-87 L3 - citeulike-article-id:600937 TI - Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria JF - The Quarterly Journal of Economics VL - 102 IS - 2 SP - 179 EP - 222 N2 - Games in which one party conveys private information to a second through messages typically admit large numbers of sequential equilibria, as the second party may entertain a wealth of beliefs in response to out-of-equilibrium messages. By restricting those out-of-equilibrium beliefs, one can sometimes eliminate many unintuitive equilibria. We present a number of formal restrictions of this sort, investigate their behavior in specific examples, and relate these restrictions to Kohlberg and Mertens' notion of stability. KW - signaling KW - tartumicro AU - Cho, In-Koo AU - Kreps, David PY - 1987/// UR - http://www.jstor.org/stable/1885060 ER -