Credible public policy Export

@article{citeulike:949880, abstract = {Credible public policy is defined in a way that incorporates competitive equilibrium behavior for households and subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium behavior for the government. It is shown that the set of all equilibrium outcome paths for credible policies can be constructed by using arguments analogous to those of Abreu (1988) for repeated games. The results are then extended to systems with state variables. Simple models of monetary policy and capital taxation are studied by way of example.}, author = {Stokey, Nancy L.}, citeulike-article-id = {949880}, citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0165-1889(91)90036-Z}, citeulike-linkout-1 = {http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V85-45R2GXH-2/2/de67ee53782d91b947bb324964eb3998}, doi = {10.1016/0165-1889(91)90036-Z}, journal = {Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control}, keywords = {411-1}, month = {October}, number = {4}, pages = {627--656}, posted-at = {2006-11-17 07:27:33}, priority = {2}, title = {Credible public policy}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0165-1889(91)90036-Z}, volume = {15}, year = {1991} }

TY - JOUR ID - citeulike:949880 L3 - citeulike-article-id:949880 N2 - Credible public policy is defined in a way that incorporates competitive equilibrium behavior for households and subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium behavior for the government. It is shown that the set of all equilibrium outcome paths for credible policies can be constructed by using arguments analogous to those of Abreu (1988) for repeated games. The results are then extended to systems with state variables. Simple models of monetary policy and capital taxation are studied by way of example. IS - 4 JF - Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control EP - 656 TI - Credible public policy VL - 15 SP - 627 KW - 411-1 AU - Stokey, Nancy PY - 1991/10// UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0165-1889(91)90036-Z ER -