Advice and behavior in intergenerational ultimatum games: An experimental approach Export

@article{SchotterSopher2007AdviceAndBehaviorInIntergenerationalUltimatumGames, abstract = {In the real world, when people play a game, they often receive advice from those that have played it before them. Such advice can facilitate the creation of a convention of behavior. This paper studies the impact of advice on the behavior subjects who engage in a non-overlapping generational Ultimatum game where after a subject plays he is replaced by another subject to whom he can offer advice. Our results document the fact that allowing advice fosters the creation of a convention of behavior in Ultimatum games. In addition, by reading the advice offered we conclude that arguments of fairness are rarely used to justify the offers of Senders but are relied upon to justify rejections by Receivers.}, author = {Schotter, Andrew and Sopher, Barry}, citeulike-article-id = {3748232}, citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2006.03.005}, citeulike-linkout-1 = {http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0899825606000388}, citeulike-linkout-2 = {http://dx.doi.org.monstera.cc.columbia.edu:2048/10.1016/j.geb.2006.03.005}, doi = {10.1016/j.geb.2006.03.005}, issn = {08998256}, journal = {Games and Economic Behavior}, keywords = {behavioral-game-theory, cultural-transmission, social-learning}, month = {February}, number = {2}, pages = {365--393}, posted-at = {2008-12-04 16:47:52}, priority = {5}, title = {Advice and behavior in intergenerational ultimatum games: An experimental approach}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2006.03.005}, volume = {58}, year = {2007} }

TY - JOUR ID - SchotterSopher2007AdviceAndBehaviorInIntergenerationalUltimatumGames L3 - citeulike-article-id:3748232 N2 - In the real world, when people play a game, they often receive advice from those that have played it before them. Such advice can facilitate the creation of a convention of behavior. This paper studies the impact of advice on the behavior subjects who engage in a non-overlapping generational Ultimatum game where after a subject plays he is replaced by another subject to whom he can offer advice. Our results document the fact that allowing advice fosters the creation of a convention of behavior in Ultimatum games. In addition, by reading the advice offered we conclude that arguments of fairness are rarely used to justify the offers of Senders but are relied upon to justify rejections by Receivers. IS - 2 JF - Games and Economic Behavior SN - 08998256 EP - 393 TI - Advice and behavior in intergenerational ultimatum games: An experimental approach VL - 58 SP - 365 KW - behavioral-game-theory KW - cultural-transmission KW - social-learning AU - Schotter, Andrew AU - Sopher, Barry PY - 2007/02// UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2006.03.005 ER -