![]() |
CiteULike | ![]() |
wandall's CiteULike | ![]() |
![]() |
|
![]() |
Register | ![]() |
Log in | ![]() |
Epistemic Consequentialism: Robert Stalnakerby: Robert Stalnaker
|
Reviews
[Write a review of this article]
Find related articles from these CiteULike users
Find related articles with these CiteULike tags
Posting History
AbstractAfter reviewing the general ideas of the consequentialist framework, I take a critical look at two of the epistemic consequentialist projects that Philip Percival considers in his paper: the first assumes that there is a notion of acceptance that contrasts with belief and that can be evaluated by its expected epistemic utility. The second uses epistemic utility to evaluate beliefs and partial beliefs themselves, as well as actions, such as gathering information in the course of an inquiry. I express scepticism about the notion of acceptance required for the first project, and argue that the second kind of project can be fruitful only with a richer notion of epistemic utility than has yet been developed.
BibTeX record
RIS record