In recent years, as multinational corporation (MNC) subsidiaries have become more closely linked to international networks, their knowledge intensity has risen, and some of their R&D has gained a more creative role. Simultaneously, and often connectedly, many subsidiaries have acquired considerable strategic independence in all aspects of their operations, and therefore are able to exercise considerable intra-firm bargaining power to influence the distribution of the firm's resources. In this context, we suggest that intra-MNC knowledge flows are a key determinant of subsidiary bargaining power. We argue that subsidiary managers can exploit such power to pursue their own ends. Such rent-seeking behavior is implicit in much of the literature on managerialism, but our analysis suggests that such behavior can now occur in headquarters-subsidiary and subsidiary-subsidiary relations. Thus subsidiary strategic independence, designed to enhance the competitiveness of outputs (market knowledge) and inputs (asset-seeking and learning), can be corroded when the pursuit of subsidiary objectives encourages rent-seeking. Empirical analysis of a sample of high-technology subsidiaries in the UK provides strong support for the theory. We examine several avenues whereby the incentives of units within the MNC can be aligned.
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