Involuntary Unemployment as a Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model Export

@article{citeulike:93167, abstract = {This paper presents an analysis of a 2-person noncooperative bargaining game in which one party is free, subject to certain frictions, to switch between rival partners. This permits us to capture the notion of an asymmetry between \"insiders\" and \"outsiders\" in the context of a firm bargaining with its workers, in the presence of unemployment.}, author = {Shaked, Avner and Sutton, John}, citeulike-article-id = {93167}, citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1913509}, citeulike-linkout-1 = {http://www.jstor.org/stable/1913509}, doi = {10.2307/1913509}, journal = {Econometrica}, keywords = {economy, unemployment}, number = {6}, pages = {1351--1364}, posted-at = {2005-02-11 12:19:36}, priority = {2}, title = {Involuntary Unemployment as a Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model}, url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1913509}, volume = {52}, year = {1984} }

TY - JOUR ID - citeulike:93167 L3 - citeulike-article-id:93167 N2 - This paper presents an analysis of a 2-person noncooperative bargaining game in which one party is free, subject to certain frictions, to switch between rival partners. This permits us to capture the notion of an asymmetry between "insiders" and "outsiders" in the context of a firm bargaining with its workers, in the presence of unemployment. IS - 6 JF - Econometrica EP - 1364 TI - Involuntary Unemployment as a Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model VL - 52 SP - 1351 KW - economy KW - unemployment AU - Shaked, Avner AU - Sutton, John PY - 1984/// UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1913509 ER -