Two Remarks on Public-Key Cryptology Export

@misc{citeulike:2363607, abstract = {e key in previous epochs. In 1997 I proposed the obvious extension to digital signatures, in order to prevent the retrospective forgery of messages signed using keys belonging to earlier epochs but without requiring that the public key infrastructure accommodate large numbers of time-limited public keys. As motivation, note that while Di\#e-Hellman key exchange [6] can provide forward security easily in interactive communication, the US Defense Messaging System (DMS) apparently uses transient...}, author = {Anderson, R.}, citeulike-article-id = {2363607}, citeulike-linkout-0 = {http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.32.8819}, keywords = {backward, cryptography, forward, key, public, secrecy, symmetric}, posted-at = {2008-02-11 19:22:32}, priority = {0}, title = {Two Remarks on Public-Key Cryptology}, url = {http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.32.8819}, year = {2000} }

TY - GEN ID - citeulike:2363607 L3 - citeulike-article-id:2363607 N2 - e key in previous epochs. In 1997 I proposed the obvious extension to digital signatures, in order to prevent the retrospective forgery of messages signed using keys belonging to earlier epochs but without requiring that the public key infrastructure accommodate large numbers of time-limited public keys. As motivation, note that while Di#e-Hellman key exchange [6] can provide forward security easily in interactive communication, the US Defense Messaging System (DMS) apparently uses transient... TI - Two Remarks on Public-Key Cryptology KW - backward KW - cryptography KW - forward KW - key KW - public KW - secrecy KW - symmetric AU - Anderson, R PY - 2000/// UR - http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.32.8819 ER -